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THE RISING TIDE OF EXPERTISE*
WILLIAM J. BUTLERt
"The detection and appraisal of such imponderables are indeed one
of the essential functions of an expert administrative agency."
Douglas, J., in International Association of Machinists, etc., Lodge
No. 35 v. N. L. R. B.'
"appraise-... ; to weigh; 
..
"imponderable-Not ponderable; incapable of being weighed."
Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition.
URISPRUDENCE may occasionally learn a salty home truth from a
layman. Simeon Strunsky recently observed, "It is amazing, but also
a bit disconcerting, how easily we can be made to take over a new for-
mula in words if smoothly and confidently presented."2 This reflection
is not without application to the science which, above all, deprecates
anything in the semblance of a formula.3 Consider a recent decision of
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.4
The National Labor Relations Act5 makes it an unfair labor practice
for an employer who is subject to the Act to "interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of"6 their right of organization for col-
lective bargaining, or to "dominate or interfere with . . . or .. . sup-
port ' 7 a labor organization. The National Labor Relations Board is
authorized "to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice" and to require "such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate
the policies of this Act."' The Act is remedial, not punitive.'
At the Bayonne, New Jersey, refineries of the Standard Oil Company,
a Joint Conference Plan of labor and management had existed from
1918 to 1937. The Plan was supported by the Company and this became
illegal upon the passage of the National Labor Relations Act on July 5,
1935. In April, 1937, the Company disassociated itself from the Plan,
* The writer wishes to express his grateful appreciation of the helpful criticisms and
suggestions of Ray I. Hardin, Esq., of the New York Bar, in the preparation of this article.
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. 311 U. S. 72, 79 (1940).
2. Topics of the Times, N. Y. Times, March 23, 1946.
3. E.g., Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 586 (1942);
N. L. R. B. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 120-121 (1944).
4. N. L. R. B. v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F. (2d) 885 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
5. July 5, 1935, c. 372; 49 STAT. 449; 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 151-166 (1942).
6. Id. at § 8(1), 49 STAT. 452; 29 U. S. C. A. 158 (1) (1942).
7. Id. at § 8(2), 49 STAT. 452, 29 U. S. C. A. 158 (2) (1942).
8. Id. at § 10(c), 49 STAT. 453, 29 U. S. C. A. 160 (c) (1942).
9. Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 311 U. S. 7 (1940).
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disclaimed any intention to influence the employees' choice of repre-
sentatives, and declared that it would recognize and deal with whom-
ever the employees might select to represent them. About a month
later, a new organization, the Bayonne Refinery Employees' Associa-
tion, was formed. The Company recognized, and thereafter bargained
with, the Association.
In November, 1941, the Board found that the Company was interfer-
ing with the organizational rights of its employees and was dominating the
Association. The Board's theory was that the Association was a con-
tinuation of the Plan and that since it was not certain that the employees,
in forming the new Association, were uninfluenced by the hope of re-
taining the Company's favor, which had theretofore been extended to
the Plan, and had not been motivated, in avoiding affiliation with any
national union, by fear of the Company's hostility, the Association
would have to be disestablished. 1
The Board petitioned the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit for enforcement of its order. The petition was granted. Circuit
Judge Learned Hand, who wrote for the Court, after suggesting the
possibility that the Court might disagree with "the Board's conclusion
that in November, 1941, four and a half years after the 'Association'
was formed, and at a time when there can be no doubt that a very great
majority of the employees still adhered to it, their adherence was a
consequence of some carry-over of the respondents' earlier favor of the
'Plan' and its well known preference for it over an alliance with any
national union,"" expressed the gist of the Court's view of the case
by stating:
"We understand the law to be that the decision of the Board upon that issue
is for all practical purposes not open to us at all; certainly not after we have
once decided that there was 'substantial' evidence that the 'disestablished'
union was immediately preceded by a period during which there was a 'domi-
nated' union"' 2
Judge Hand recognized that he was pronouncing a doctrine which
would occasion some surprise, for he proceeded to point out:
"Since we recognize how momentous may be such an abdication of any
power of review, especially as it may result in the loss of those very rights of
employees which it is the purpose of the act to protect, we feel justified in
stating our reasons a little at length, even though we have in effect already
decided the issue.""13
10. Matter of Standard Oil Co., 43 N. L. R. B. 12 (1942).
11. N. L. R. B. v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F. (2d) 885, 887 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
12. Id. at 885.
13. Ibid.
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His statement of the reasons for declining to entertain the question
whether the Board was justified in making its finding is too long for
full quotation. After first pointing out that the question whether the
employer's influence upon the will of his employees (a) determined their
choice when they formed the new union in 1937 and (b) continued to
influence them in adhering to the new union, might seem to concern
only human motives of a kind with which courts are not unaccustomed
to deal, and to be no different in principle from the questions involved
in determining an employer's motive in discharging an employee, he
transferred the problem to a somewhat different plane by asserting:
"... but the question of how deeply an employer's relations with his employees
will overbear their will, and how long that influence will last, is, or at least it
may be thought to be, of another sort, to decide which a board, or tribunal
chosen from those who have had long acquaintance with labor relations, may
acquire a competence beyond that of any court."'14
Judge Hand proceeded to amplify the reasoning suggested in the fore-
going excerpt by pointing out that there can be issues of fact which
courts would be altogether incompetent to decide, citing as an instance
the decision of a board of qualified chemists as to the chemical reaction
between a number of elements.
Judge Hand then went on to say:
"Conceivably labor disputes might have been considered as demanding no
such specialized knowledge for their solution. On the other hand they have
been made the occasion of wide study, and a very large literature has arisen,
with which those only are familiar who have become adepts. Like any other
group of phenomena, when isolated and intensively examined, these relations
appear to fall into more or less uniform models or patterns, which put those
well skilled in the subject at an advantage which no bench of judges can hope
to rival. This the Supreme Court has recognized in a number of decisions, par-
ticularly when the Board's decision upon the question now before us has
come up." 1
This is probably as profound a salaam as can be found in the books.
It comes as no surprise to those who have had some contact with the
body of principles developed to govern the actions of the administra-
tive agencies of the Government, particularly during the past decade.
It represents, however, probably the most detailed and authoritative
attempt to analyze and rationalize a theory which has been propounded
over a considerable period of years by acadmicians and courts alike,
namely, that administrative agencies are expert bodies which deal with
14. Ibid.
15. Id. at 887-888.
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specialized subject matters and whose findings of fact, views as to statu-
tory policy and, to some extent, conclusions of law, should foreclose
any inquiry by the courts as to whether or not they are correct, or at
least evoke the special deference which is due to esoteric learning and
skill. The question whether this theory is valid may well warrant some
attention.
Why Administrative Agencies?
It is not essential for the present purpose to discuss the basic philoso-
phy of administrative law and of the operations of administrative agen-
cies. There is a vast and steadily growing literature on this subject.'6
In order to put in focus the subject of this article, it is sufficient to say
that beginning with the enactment of the Interstate Commerce Act in
1887 there began in the United States the significant development of
administrative agencies exercising regulatory functions. These functions
manifest themselves in the decision of controversies between private
parties or between private parties and the Government, or in the issu-
ance of general rules regulating conduct in the field entrusted to the par-
ticular administrative agency. Their characteristics, in'other words, are
partly quasi-legislative, and partly quasi-judicial. 7
The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure 8
found over 200 of these agencies,.27 of them exercising functions of
sufficient importance to warrant detailed monographs which were pre-
pared and filed with Congress as a basis for the Committee's study of
the need of procedural reform. 9 The monographs, submitted in 1940,
did not, of course, include any of the wartime agencies, such as the
Office of Price Administration, the War Labor Board, the Wage Stabiliza-
tion Board, the War Production Board, etc. But even in 1940 the agen-
cies ranged from the Interstate Commerce Commission, regulating rail-
roads, motor carriers, and, to some extent, coastal steamship lines, through
the Veterans' Administration, the Federal Communications Commission,
16. For a working bibliography, see VANDERBILT, ONE HUNDRED YEARS Or ADus-
TRATVE LAW, in LAW, A CENTURY OF PROGRESS 117, 141-144; See also Smith, Improving the
Administration of Justice in Administrative Processes (1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 127; Oppen-
heimer, Supreme Court and Administrative Law (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 1; Frankfurter,
Foreword (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 515.
17. See, e.g., Humphrey's Exec. v. United States, 295 U. S. 602, 628-629 (1935);
St. Joseph's Stock Yards v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 50-51 (1936) ; see also, Final Re-
port of Att'y Gen's. Committee on Administrative Procedure, SEN.. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. 11-14.
18. Final Report of Att'y Gen's Comm., op. cit. supra note 17, p. 8n.
19. SEN. Doe. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (13 parts); SEN. Doe. No. 10, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. (14 parts).
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the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission,
the Federal Power Commission, and many others, to the National
Labor Relations Board, which regulates labor-management relationships
so far as they have to do with the right of employees to organize for
collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing.
The "Expertise" Formula
The establishment of these administrative agencies is said to be the
answer of modern law to the challenge that "Science and technology can-
not reshape society while law maintains its Blackstonian essences."'
And it is apparently thought to be a corollary that the agencies them-
selves are bodies possessed of superior skill and knowledge, whose deter-
minations on disputed facts, of views on policies and even of
conclusions of law are entitled to special weight.
This theory, which has lately .come to be. known as the "expertise"
theory,2 has been expressed in various ways. Thus, Chief justice
Hughes has stated that the administrative process had its origin in
"a deepening conviction of the impotency of Legislature with respect to some of
the most important departments of law making. Complaints must be heard,
expert investigation conducted, complex situations deliberately and impartially
analyzed, and legislative rules intelligently adapted to a myriad of instances
falling within a general class."1
22
Addressing the Federal Bar Association in February of 1931, Chief
Justice Hughes said:
"Experience, expertness and continuity of supervision, which could only be
had by administrative agencies in a particular field, have come to be impera-
tively needed. " 23
Robert M. Cooper,. a protagonist of the administrative process, ex-
presses one of the reasons for it as follows:
20. Frankfurter, Foreword (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 515. Cf., Dickinson, Judicial Control
of Official Discretion (1928) 22 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 275.
21. The spelling is not yet standardized. Mr. Justice Frankfurter uses "expertise" (Federal
Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 320 U. S. 591, 627 (1944)); Mr. Jus-
tice Rutledge prefers "expertize" (Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley, 14 U. S. L.
WEEx 4249 (U. S. 1946)); in the more advanced writings it is called "the expertise" (e.g.,
Davison, Administrative Technique-The Report on Administrative Procedure (1941) 41
COL. L. REv. 628, 638), the definite article apparently' being intended to convey the same
overtones as in "He has the Gaelic."
22. Hughes, Some Aspects of Development of American Law (1916) 39 REP. N. Y. ST.
BAR Assoc. 266, 269.
23. Address to Federal Bar Assoc., N. Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1931, p. 18.
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"In the second place, Congress possesses neither the scientific knowledge nor
the technical competence to define completely the national policy in many of its
more complicated aspects.1
24
Cooper goes on to assert:
"It is hardly reasonable to assume that a judiciary, completely untrained in
the problems of public administration, is more capable or more likely to reach
proper results than experienced administrators selected primarily for their
specialized knowledge, technical competence, and thorough familiarity with
the intricacies of modern governmental policies. '2 5
Dickinson, another supporter of the administrative process, thus states
the reason for the "expertise" rule:
"The administration of general legislation by technical experts, skilled and
trained in specialized fields, is the contemporary answer to the challenge to
bridge the gap between popular government and scientific government.12
Mr. Justice Holmes has expressed the qualifications of expert admin-
istrative agencies as follows:
"They express an intuition of experience which outruns analysis and sums up
many unnamed and tangled impressions; impressions which may lie beneath con-
sciousness without losing their worth." 2
7
The Supreme Court of the United States has spoken of the general
theory underlying the necessity of administrative agencies in the follow-
ing words:
"... The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer
to others, the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested. Un-
24. Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 577,
581n. .e., it is only with respect to those matters as to which Congress has sufficient scien-
tific knowledge and technical competence that it is vested with the legislative power of
the United States under Article I, § 1 of the Constitution. We are not to suppose, how-
ever, that the incompetence of Congress is all that makes the administrative process neces-
sary. It was also necessary to get "the enforcement of laws of social and economic impact
out of the hands of the courts." (Feller, Administrative Law Investigation Comes of Age
(1941) 41 COL. L. REV. 589, 599).
25. Cooper, op. cit. supra note 24 at 595.
26. Dickinson, Judicial Control of Official Discretion (1928) 22 A-. PoL. Sci. REv. 275;
see also, Stern, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative
Analysis (1944) 58 HARV. L. REv. 70, 81-88, 100; Report of Att'y Gen's Committee,
op. cit. supra note 17 at 12-16; Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Ad-
ministrative Process (1942) 55 HAuv. L. REv. 364, 416-423.
27. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U. S. 585, 598 (1907). The
story that this quotation was once printed on the masthead of the New York Morning
Telegraph is probably apocryphal.
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doubtedly legislation must often be adapted to complex conditions involving
a host of details with which the national legislature cannot deal directly. The
Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its
function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to
selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed
limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the
legislature is to apply. Without capacity to give authorizations of that sort
we should have the anomaly of a legislative power which in many circum-
stances calling for its exertion would be but a futility.
'28
Of course, the foregoing excerpts do not reflect an opinion which is
held unanimously regarding either the desirability of administrative
agencies or the reasons why they have been established. Laird Bell,
writing in the American Bar Association Journal, expresses this view:
"When a situation is too hot for Congress to handle, statesmen create a
board, tell it to do the right thing and hurry on to the really serious business
of getting re-elected."2 9
The specific postulate that the administrative agencies are possessed
of specialized and expert knowledge has been expressed by the Supreme
Court with respect to many of the most important of these agencies.
Thus, the Court has said of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
"'It is not disputable that from the beginning the very purpose for which the
Commission was created was to bring into existence a body which from its
peculiar character would be most fitted to primarily decide whether from facts,
disputed or undisputed, in a given case preference or discrimination ex-
isted. .. .' "30
The Court further said in the same case:
"As exemplified by this record, the Commission is 'informed by experience'
of years in its consideration of the relationship of forwarders to our national
transportation system. 31
Likewise, the Federal Trade Commission has been thus described by
the Supreme Court:
"... It was created with the avowed purpose of lodging the administrative
28. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 421 (1935).
29. Bell, Let Me Find The Facts (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 552, 553; see also, Pound, For
the "Minority Report" (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 664.
30. United States v. Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., 235 U. S. 314 (1914) quoted in,
United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 310 U. S. 344, 352 (1940).
31. Id. at 353; see also, Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Union Pacific RR. Co., 222
U. S. 541 (1912).
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functions committed to it in 'a body specially competent to deal with them
by reason of information, experience and careful study of the business and
economic conditions of the industry affected,' and it was organized in such a
manner, with respect to the length and expiration of the terms of office of its
members, as would 'give to them an opportunity to acquire the expertness
in dealing with these special questions concerning industry that comes from
experience.' ",32
Of the Federal Communications Commission, the Supreme Court has
said:
"While this criterion [the public convenience, interest or necessity] is as
concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated
authority permit, it serves as a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion
by the expert body which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative
policy."'
33
Mr. Justice Black objected to the decision of the majority of the Court
in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation,3 4 be-
cause he thought it did not defer sufficiently to the expertise of the
Commission. He said:
"The Commission did not 'explicitly disavow' any reliance on what its mem-
bers had learned in their years of experience and of course, they, as trade
experts, made their findings that respondent's practice was 'detrimental to the
interests of investors' in the light of their knowledge."3 5
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, did not deny that
the Commission actually had the expertise claimed by Mr. Justice Black.
He merely thought that in the case before the Court the Commission
had not employed "new standards reflecting the experience gained by it
in effectuating the legislative policy, ' 36 but had acted on the basis of
traditional equitable principles.
Of the National Labor Relations Board, the Supreme Court has re-
cently said:
"One of the purposes which lead to the creation of such boards is to have
decisions based upon evidential facts under the particular statute made by
32. Federal Trade Commission v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U. S. 304, 314
(1934); quoting from Rep. of Sen. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, No. 597, 63rd Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914) 9, 11.
33. Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U. S. 134,
138 (1940).
34. 318 U. S. 80 (1943).
35. Id. at 98-99.
36. Id. at 89.
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experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities of the
subject which is entrusted to their administration. '37
Substantially the same pronouncements have been made with respect,
among others, to the superior qualifications of public boards adminis-
tering workmen's compensation,3 the Shipping Act09 and the Bitumi-
nous Coal Act."
Some Constitutional Implications
Expertise then, as a theory, is well established in the pronouncements
of the Supreme Court. It is probably too late in the game to inquire
whether the Constitution permits the adjustment of the rights of citizens
to be based upon policies declared or legal principles formulated or
facts found by administrative agencies without control by the courts at
least to the same extent as in the case of juries. Yet,
"When the lawyers and learned men of Massachuestts made a new declara-
tion of rights and frame of government for the inhabitants of this Common-
wealth in 1780, they did not call themselves experts and say that we common
people ought to trust them to frame the government because we couldn't be
expected to understand the affairs of state. They sent the new constitution to
the town clerks in time for the March meetings so the home folks could talk it
over and decide whether it should go into effect. I read in a book by a his-
torian fellow up at Harvard that the home folks talked that constitution over
pretty thoroughly and voted on it one article at a time; and it pretty near
failed of passage. Maybe the lawyers and learned men took pains to make it
correct and serviceable, as it has been proved in practice, because they knew
that the people would look into it and wouldn't take it if they weren't pleased."4 1
It is worth noting, too, that the Constitution itself exhibits no naive
trust in experts, as witness not only the provision securing the right
of jury trial in all actions at common law,42 but also the due process
clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
According to the advocates of administrative government, the admin-
istrative process is not judicial process.43 Indeed, the strongest argu-
ment advanced for the administrative process is that it is made neces-
37. Republic Aviation Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 324 U. S. 793, 800 (1945); see also,
N. L. R. B. v. Waterman Steamship Co., 309 U. S. 206, 208-209 (1940).
38. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 46-47 (1932).
39. Swayne & Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U. S. 297, 303-304 (1937).
40. Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402, 412-413 (1941).
41. Gardner, Review of Landis' "The Administrative Process" (1938) 52 HARv. L.
REv. 336.
42. U. S. CONST. AMEND. VII.
43. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 50-51 (1932).
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sary by the inadequacy of the judicial process, as well as the inadequacy
of the legislative process.44
The notion that due process, as defined in the Constitution, does not
require judicial process, found expression in the concurring opinion of
Brandeis, J., in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States. He there
stated:
"... The inexorable safeguard which the due process clause assures is not
that a court may examine whether the findings as to value or income are cor-
rect, but that the trier of the facts shall be an impartial tribunal; that no find-
ing shall be made except upon due notice and opportunity to be heard; that
the procedure at the hearing shall be consistent with the essentials of a fair
trial; and that it shall be conducted in such a way that there will be oppor-
tunity for a court to determine whether the applicable rules of law and pro-
cedure were observed.
'
"
45
He further stated:
"The Fifth Amendment, like the Fourteenth, declares that property may not
be taken without due process of law. But there is nothing in the text of the
Constitution (including the Amendments) which tells the reader whether to
constitute due process it is necessary that there be opportunity for a judicial
review of the correctness of the findings of fact made by the Secretary of Agri-
culture concerning the value of this property or its net income. To learn what
the procedure must be in a particular situation, in order to constitute due
process, we turn necessarily to the decisions of our Court. These tell us that
due process does not require that a decision made by an appropriate tribunal
shall be reviewable by another. [citing cases] They tell us that due process
is not necessarily judicial process ... "-6
This demonstrates that the process of deciding facts upon which life,
liberty or property may depend can, of course, be called something other
than judicial process. But only by main strength. Judicial it is and
judicial it remains, by whatever name it is called. It is the process of
judging between contending assertions of fact and law and imposing,
with the state's authority, obligations on the litigants as a result of the
determination. 47 And if it is judicial process, it is certainly the judicial
44. Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law Theory (1938)
47 YALE L. J. 538; Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts (1938) 47 YALE L. J.
519; Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 577.
45. 298 U. S. 38, 73 (1936). We shall consider presently (infra page 59) whether
the requirements of notice and hearing are anything more than an apple of Sodom in
the absence of some control over the result.
46. Id. at 76-77; see also, Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts (1938) 47
YALE L. J. 519.
47. Nevertheless, in deference to current terminology, the administrative process and
the judicial process will hereafter be spoken of as if they were distinct things.
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process of the United States if it is employed by an agency of the United
States. But the Constitution provides that "the judicial Power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.
'48
Indeed, it was only upon the hypothesis that the actions of an ad-
ministrative agency did not affect life, liberty or property in the par-
ticular case that the Supreme Court found it possible to sustain the con-
stitutionality of the Tea Inspection Act of March 2, 1897.19 The Act
provided for the appointment by the Secretary of the Treasury of a
board of experts in teas, authorized by the Secretary, upon the recom-
mendation of the board, to fix and establish uniform standards of purity,
quality and fitness for consumption of all kinds of teas imported into
the United States, and provided for the exclusion of imports of teas
found to be below the prescribed quality. Plaintiff's tea was excluded
and he sued the Collector of the Port of New York for damages for
wrongful seizure. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant
upon the ground that the only question was as to the constitutionality of
the statute and that the statute was constitutional. The Supreme Court,
in affirming," rejected the argument that the statute denied due process
of law by failing to accord a hearing before the Board of Tea Inspec-
tors and the Secretary of the Treasury in establishing the standards in
question, and before the general appraisers upon the reexamination of
the tea. The Court held it a sufficient answer to this argument that
"The provisions in respect to the fixing of standards and the examination of
samples by government experts was for the purpose of determining whether
the conditions existed which conferred the right to import, and they therefore
in no just sense concerned a taking of property. This latter question was in-
tended by Congress to be finally settled, not by a judicial proceeding, but by
the action of the agents of the government, upon whom power on the subject
was conferred."'
But where the action of an administrative agency does affect life,
liberty or property, due process may well require that its determina-
tion of facts be controlled by the courts at least to the degree that jury
verdicts are so controlled.
This question recently came before the Supreme Court in Estep .v.
United States, decided February 4, 1946.2 Estep was convicted. of a
violation of Section 11 of the Selective Service Act for refusing to obey
48. U. S. CONST. ART. HI, § 1.
49. 29 STAT. 604, 21 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1926).
So. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1904).
51. Id. at 497.
52. - U. S. -, 66 Sup. Ct. 423 (1946).
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an induction order of his local draft board. He had attempted, on his
trial, to defend on the ground, among others, that as a Jehovah's witness
he was a minister of religion and had been improperly denied exemption
from service because the classifying agencies acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in refusing to classify him as IV-D. The District Court re-
fused to allow Estep to introduce any evidence to sustain this conten-
tion. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with .a di-
vided vote,5" but the Supreme Court reversed (5 to 3) and held that
Estep was entitled to an opportunity to show that the local board had
gone "beyond its jurisdiction." 4 Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the
majority, after pointing out that the Selective Service Act made no pro-
vision for judicial review of the acts of the Selective Service agencies,
and after observing that there are situations in which "judicial review
may indeed be required by the Constitution" 5 proceeded to determine
the case upon the theory that Congress presumably did not intend
to preclude a judicial inquiry in a criminal case into the question
whether the order of the administrative agency which the defendant was
charged with having disobeyed was lawful or unlawful. 6
But since Congress has specifically provided that the decisions of
the local boards are final, it is difficult to avoid the inference that
what Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion really means is that a conviction of
violating an invalid order of an administrative agency without afford-
ing the defendant an opportunity to prove its invalidity would be in
violation of the due process clause." This, indeed, was the express
ground upon which Mr. Justice Rutledge and Mr. Justice Murphy con-
curred in the Estep decision. Further, since the order of the local board,
if unlawful, was unlawful because the board erroneously decided that
Estep was not a minister of religion, it is also difficult to avoid the con-
clusion that the decision stands, implicitly, for the proposition that life,
liberty or property cannot be affected by the factual determination of
an administrative agency unless an opportunity is afforded for a tri-
bunal exercising the judicial power of the United States to pass upon
53. 150 F. (2d) 768 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945).
54. - U. S. -, 66 Sup. Ct. at 427.
55. Id. at -, 66 Sup. Ct. at 426, citing Ng Fung Ho v. White. 259 U. S. 276 (1922),
and see also, Dickinson, Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations, a Summary and
Evaluation (1941) 25 AD=. L. REv. 588, 594.
56. Id. at -, 66 Sup. Ct. at 427.
57. The Court has had little difficulty in other cases in finding that Congress intended
no judicial review other than that expressly provided for (e.g., Switchmen's Union v. Medi-
ation Board, 320 U. S. 297, 301-302 (1941)) nor does the opinion in the Estep case point
to any actual evidence of congressional intent to allow the review which Estep sought.
What the reasoning of the Court amounts to is that Congress must have meant to allow it.
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the question whether the agency's finding is supported by evidence.5
But the question under .consideration is not so much whether there
are any constitutional limitations upon the expertise theory. It is rather
to what extent the theory itself will stand examination. In other words,
if we go behind the generalized pronouncements what basis do we find
for the idea that administrative agencies are in any true sense experts
having specialized knowledge which entitles their determinations,
either upon the facts of a given case, or upon general formulation of
policy, to the kind of respectful consideration which the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit accorded to the finding of the Labor
Board in the Standard Oil case?59
The Statutes Governing Judicial Review
If the courts are required to treat with special deference the findings
of administrative agencies, one would expect to find in the review sec-
tions of the applicable statutes some provision directing them to do so.
Turning to these sections what do we find? Take first the Standard Oil
case itself. The Circuit Court of Appeals was authorized to review the
Board's order by Section 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act.
That section provides that "The findings of the Board as to the facts,
if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive." It is well established
that the phrase "supported by evidence" as used in this section, is synony-
mous with the phrase "supported by substantial evidence."'6 That is to
say, a mere scintilla of evidence is not sufficient to support a finding by
the Board. The court will look into the evidence to the extent of deter-
mining whether it is such "as a reasonable mind might accept as ade-
quate to support a conclusion.""
But this is precisely the rule of review which has existed for many
years in the case of judgments on verdicts of juries when they are ap-
58. The Court speaks of Estep's complaint against the local board's action in refus-
ing to classify him as a minister of religion as a charge that the board acted "arbitrarily
and capriciously." But this can mean hardly anything other than that Estep ought to be
allowed to convince the jury on his trial that there was substantial evidence before the
local board that he was a minister of religion and no substantial evidence to the contrary.
Estep's right to go into this question on the criminal trial would, of course, not be in-
consistent wth the Court's injunction (- U. S. -, 66 Sup. Ct. at 427) that the weight
of the evidence as to classification is not to be reviewed in the criminal case. The question of
jurisdiction is adinittedly reached "if there is no basis in fact for the classification which it
[the local board] gave the registrant." (Id. at -, 66 Sup. Ct. at 427.)
59. Supra, pages 20-21.
60. Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938); N. L. R. B. v.
Columbian etc. Co., 306 U. S. 292, 300 (1939).
61. Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 229.
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pealed to Circuit Courts of Appeals. 2 In other words, what the Circuit
Court of Appeals had before it for review in the Standard Oil case was
an order which, so far as the express declaration of Congress was con-
cerned, was entitled to exactly the degree of consideration that would
be extended to the verdict of a jury-nothing less and nothing more.
No one supposes that Judge Hand would have declared that a ques-
tion of fact decided by a jury was "not open to us at all." It was only
because the Labor Board was conceived to be a body possessing special
competence which a jury would not have that judge Hand took occa-
sion to refuse to consider the question of fact and to explain the reasons
for his judicial "abdication." Yet, to the extent that he treated the find-
ing of the Board as something entitled to more respectful consideration
than the verdict of a jury, he was indulging in an abdication to which
he had not been constrained by Congress.
That is to say, there is nothing in the National Labor Relations Act
which puts a finding by the Labor Board on any higher plane than the
verdict of a jury. The same may be said of the statutes governing judi-
cial review of the orders of the other principal administrative agencies,
all of which either expressly contain, or have by interpretation been
held to provide, the "substantial evidence" rule."
If we were to judge the degree of expertness of the fact-finding body
according to limitations placed upon the power of review, we should
have to conclude that the jury is more expert than the trial judge sit-
ting in an equity case, for in cases tried by the District Court
without a jury, the Circuit Court of Appeals can review and reverse
if the findings are "clearly erroneous."64 This involves a weighing of
the evidence to a degree not permitted where the appeal is from the ver-
dict of the jury.
Apparently, then, the statement of the Attorney General's Commit-
tee65 that enlargement of judicial review of the findings of administra-
tive agencies "would destroy the values of adjudication of fact by ex-
perts or specialists in the field involved" may be taken cum grano.
Another theory which has been urged in opposition to judicial review of
the findings of administrative agencies is that finality in the findings of ad-
ministrative agencies is required for reasons of expedition in the adminis-
62. Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U. S. 90 (1930); Galloway v. United States, 319 U. S. 37Z
(1943).
63. Final Report of Att'y Gen's Committee, op. cit. supra note 17 at 90, 21On; Stason,
"Substantial Evidence" in Administrative Law (1941) 89 U. oF PA. L. REv. 1026, 1027,
1029-1030.
64. District of Columbia v. Pace, 320 U. S. 698, 701-702 (1944); Stem, op. cit. supra
note 26 at 79-89.
65. Stern, op. cit. supra note 26 at 91-92.
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trative process, i.e., because "an ounce of action is worth a pound of argu-
ment"6 or because there must be "administrative efficiency and flexi-
bility.16 7 But these reasons are almost comically irrelevant. It is of
little use to compare an ounce of action with a pound of argument un-
less we know that we are talking about good action and bad argument.
And the whole question is whether it is possible to know in a given case
whether the action is good or the argument bad without invoking the
judicial process. Also, it is difficult to perceive what administrative
efficiency and flexibility have to do with determining whether or not
rights have been adjudicated by administrative agencies on the basis of
purported facts which are not actually facts at all.68
All these reflections have been by way of inquiring whether there is
anything in the statutory material or in the nature of the process itself
which requires that the determinations of administrative bodies be given
some special standing and respect. No account has so far been taken of
the question whether and to what extent analysis of the statutory delega-
tions to the various administrative agencies of the Government reveal that
these agencies, whether because of personal qualifications, or because of
the nature of the fields in which they work, can in any real sense be consid-
ered qualified to make determinations upon which special reliance should
be placed.
What is Expertise?
To begin with, it is no stranger to the law. From early times the views
of experts have been used in lawsuits to guide the finders of fact upon
subjects requiring special knowledge. Physicians, chemists, engineers
and the like have been permitted to express their opinions on ques-
66. Veto message on Logan-Walter Bill, Dec. 18, 1940 (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 52, 53.
67. Dickinson, Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations, A Summary and
Evaluation (1941) 25 MmN. L. REv. 588, 603.
68. BENJAmn, ADm IISTRATIVE ADTUICATION IN NEW YORK (1942) 22-23 warns that
policy cannot properly have anything to do with fact finding. Otherwise, there would
seem to be something more than playfulness in the old quatrain:
"The proper skill of expertise
Is to arrange the premises
So that the most foregone conclusion
Will fit therein without confusion."
In point of fact, one of thg significant differences between the administrative process and
the judical process is, as the Attorney General's Committee has pointed out (op. cit supra
note 17 at 1-3, 4) that the judicial process works, in the main, after the event, whereas
the administrative process represents an effort to work before the event and for preventive
purposes. This suggests that the expertise idea may be a working disguise for the truth
that it is impossible in the nature of things to arrive, before the event, at any certainty
about what the facts are going to be.
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tions peculiar to their specialty and about which they are presumed to
know more than the court or jury.69
But before we can treat an expert as an expert we must be sure of
two things: First, the subject matter as to which he expresses his
opinion must be one with respect to which there is conceded to be a
specialized body of knowledge which can be acquired only by study and
training, and which is not possessed by the ordinary run of men; Second,
the knowledge must be knowledge in a substantial sense. That is to say,
there must be some reasonably objective standard of certainty. Absent
this, there is, of course, no way in the world of knowing whether the
expert has any idea what he is talking about.7" A physician is taken on
faith because it is known from experience that his judgments are sus-
ceptible of being tested and it is assumed in the given case that they
have been tested and their validity indicated. An engineer is
taken on faith because he deals with matters of physics, which is among
the exact sciences. But no one takes on faith, except upon a frankly
gambling basis, an asserted "marked expert" who professes to be able
to predict security prices. The contrast between the market expert and
the engineer is plain. The market expert has no reasonably objective
standard of certainty.71
This distinction between fields which may properly be said to be
the subject of expertness and fields not so subject can be perceived not
only in respect of the problem of prognostication, but also in respect
of the problem of judging the causes of things which have happened in
the past, i.e., of finding out what the facts are. The radio repair man
can, if he is competent, usually tell what made the receiver squeal. But
no one has yet told what caused the depression of the 1930's.
So that the expert, if he expects to have any special consideration
accorded to his judgments, must be one who deals in a field which in-
volves genuine knowledge and some approximation of certainty. An-
other qualification which the judgment of the expert must have is that
it be addressed to a problem which is solvable within his own field.
69. 7 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) §§ 1917-1918; Hand, Historical and Practical
Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony (1J01) 15 HRv. L. REv. 40.
10. Otherwise the importunities of the astrologers would be embarrassing.
71. Thus. Hand, op. cit. supra note 66 at 55 points out that "the expert is necessary
and logical only to supply to the jury certain propositions of general applicability, or laws
of nature, which are not the heritage of the ordinary man whom the jury, like the Greek
chorus, heroically shadow forth." Since the only proposition of general applicability or
law of nature about market movements or business conditions generally, is that they are
utterly unpredictable and that the best that can be done about them is to make a for-
tunate guess, the only answer the Greek chorus could be expected to make to the proffered
judgments of experts on these subjects would be " eoL / "
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Thus, the physician is no expert when he advocates euthanasia. Nor is
the engineer an expert on the question whether a tunnel between Staten
Island and Long Island is desirable. No one doubts that the question
involves some problems of engineering, but it cannot be answered with-
out the solution of a host of problems about which the engineer knows
no more than the ordinary citizen.
One result of the circumstance that few problems involving the ad-
justment of juridical rights can be solved within the field of any expert
or group of experts is that the expert's opinion has always been consid-
ered one item of evidence to be taken into consideration by those whose
duty it is to decide the facts upon the basis of all the problems involved.
Phrased in another way, it has always been the right of the patient to
discharge the doctor, either because his charge is too high or because
the patient would prefer the illness to the particular remedy which the
doctor proposes.72
How Expert Are the Agencies?
To what extent can these basic considerations be said to apply to the
administrative agencies of the Government? The question has not al-
together gone without attention. Thus, Dickinson says:
"The second consideration which moist be kept in mind in considering the
view that rules of law should be developed by the administrative agencies
themselves rather than by the courts is that there is a possibility of over-
valuing, or at least overemphasizing, the element of expertness which adminis-
trative agencies are supposed to possess. It is not necessary to say too much
concerning the fact that the responsible heads of these agencies are frequently
political characters brought into the agency from some other occupation far
from the field of its specialty, and so having no expertness whatever of their
own to start with. This deficiency is no doubt to some extent remedied by the
fact that at least up to a certain point the action of the agencies is guided
by their permanent technical staffs. It is the expertness of these staff officials
which may in a certain sense be misconceived because it is a different kind of
expertness from what we mean by the expertness of the practicing physician in
curing patients or the expertness of the machinist in building and repairing
machines. When we say that a physician or a machinist is an expert, we mean
that he is habitually engaged -in doing himself the things in which his expert-
ness consists. The expertness of the technicians employed by regulatory bodies
is usually something very different. Very few staff employees of a public utility
commission have ever been engaged in the operation of a railroad or a power
company. They are not experts in doing the things which they are regulating.
72. That the development of expertise in the administrative process involves a basic
transformation of the expert from a -consultant to a master is implicit in Professor Frank-
furter's explanation of the necessity for the administrative process (supra page 7).
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They are experts as students or analysts, observing, but always from the out-
side and with a touch of unfamiliarity, the subject matter in which their ex-
pertness is supposed to consist, and this must inevitably be taken into account
in evaluating the importance of that expertness and the degree of confidence to
be reposed in it."73
In a recent symposium on administrative law,' 4 Professor Brown
questioned the validity of the expertise formula as applied to the admin-
istrative agencies.7'5 Dean Landis, a protagonist of the administrative
process, replied to Professor Brown, citing the effort to establish public
utility rate bases upon something other than spot reproduction cost as
evidence of the necessity which called into play the expertness of ad-
ministrative rate-making bodies.76  This was indeed a curious illustra-
tion, since the other types of data which have grown in popularity in
public utility rate-making involve sheer guesswork to a degree that
would never be tolerated in an engineering estimate of reproduction
cost.
7 7
However this may be, it is of even greater importance that some criti-
cal analysis be devoted to the workings of the principal administrative
agencies of the United States so that we may get an idea of the extent to
which they really may be said to be operating in specialized or technical
fields which lend special weight to their judgments. Although this question
is the main concern, it is not without interest that there are other genuine
questions involved relating to the personal qualifications of the heads
of the administrative agencies.
Qualifications of the Administrators
That they are, in the main, political appointees and that they operate
in fields which are subject to intense political pressure is well known and
has received critical attention.7' But apart from political pressure, there
is a real question whether the statutes furnish any real guaranty of
expert treatment of the subjects entrusted to the various agencies. Thus,
73. Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 67, at 602; see also, Pound, The Place of the Judiciary
in Democratic Polity (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 133, 134.
74. (1939) 9 Am. LAW SCHOOL REV. 139-184.
75. Id. at 178-180. The reference is to Professor R. A. Brown of Washington University.
76. Id. at 181.
77. Cf., 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 151. Original cost may or may not be
available as actual figures, and may or may not require some apportionment. But "pru-
dent investment" and "capitalized earnings" bring into play all the fanciful lucubrations
springing from the subjective preferences of the various schools.
78. See, e.g., Report of Special Committee on Administrative Law (1938) 63 REP. Al.
BAR Assoc., 331, 334-335; Hughes, C. J., in St. Joseph's Stock Yards v. United States,
298 U. S. 38, 52 (1936).
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the Interstate Commerce Act7" provides, irf section 11, for a Commis-
sion of eleven members with terms of seven years. There are no quali-
fications specified for any Commissioner except that not more than six
of them may be from the same political party. The Federal Trade Com-
mission is composed of five members with terms of seven years, no more
than three of whom may be from the same political party. 0 No other
qualifications are specified. The Federal Communications Commission
is composed of seven Commissioners, not more than four of whom may
be from the same political party. The only qualification specified by
the Act is a negative one, namely, that no commissioner may have any-
thing to do with the communications business.8 The Securities and Ex-
change Commission is composed of five commissioners, with terms of
five years, not more than three of whom can be from the same political
party, and no other qualification is specified in the statute.82 The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board is composed of three members, with terms
of five years. The Act specifies no qualifications.83
It is not contended even by the most ardent apologists for the admin-
istrative process that these commissioners or board members are, or ever
become, really expert in the field in which the agency operates. The
theory advanced is that the expertness is really to be found in the staff.
Thus, Davidson,84 states:
"The possibilities in the passage quoted in the margin from the second
Morgan case85 undoubtedly form the basis for the new procedure of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission, which has also been used in part by the
National Labor Relations Board and by the Department of Agriculture. It is
an attempt to devise an indigenous administrative procedure to take care of
the need for consultation with the technical and expert staffs by the agency
heads in formulating their proposed findings and proposed order. It is the
essence of the expertise that technique and experience in a field can be used
by the non-specialist agency heads to assist them in their final decision. Other-
wise any points not covered by the record must be left out even though they
79. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 STAT. 379, 49 U. S. C. A. § 1 et seq. (1929).
80. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, c. 311, 38 STAT. 717, 15 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1941).
81. Act of June 19, 1934, c. 652, 48 STAT. 1066, 47 U. S. C. A. § 154(b) (Supp. 1945).
82. Act of June 6, 1934, c. 404, 48 STAT. 885, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78(d) (1941).
83. Act of July 5, 1935, c. 372, 49 STAT. 451, 29 U. S. C. A. § 153(a) (1942).
84. Davison, Administrative Technique-The Report on Administrative Procedure
(1941) 41 CoL. L. Rav. 628, 638-639.
85. The passage referred to is from Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 21-22 (1938).
In substance, it points out that although the absence of an Examiner's report and recom-
mendations might not be fatal to a proceeding in the Department of Agriculture if it
appeared that the Secretary had made his own appraisal of the evidence and findings of
fact, that rule could not save a proceeding in which the Secretary accepted and made his
own the findings of his subordinates.
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are generally understood by the specialist practitioners and members of the
Commission's staff of specialists. The solution of a rehearing to admit some
technical testimony known to everyone except the agency heads seems a need-
less waste of time and unnecessary delay. Yet the judicial analogy would re-
quire that every item not in the record should be put in by a rehearing before
it can be considered. In the work of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion is found the technique of utilizing the expertise by having proposed find-
ings and order prepared with ex parte technical help, but leaving the parties
free to except and argue before a final order is made. In discussing judicial
review of that Commission's orders, in the Pottsville case, the court had an
opportunity to discuss the nature of the administrative process. It concluded
that to the essentially different and unique nature of the administrative process,
the judicial technique is not applicable."
How the technique here outlined is to be reconciled with the require-
ment that the head of the agency must appraise the evidence and make
the determination,"6 Mr. Davidson does not explain. 7
How Specialized is the Subject Matter?
But all this is by way of introduction to the principal question, which
is whether the subject matters entrusted to the various administrative
86. In the first Morgan case (298 U. S. 468, 481-482 (1936)) the Court cautioned that
the weight attached by law to the findings of administrative agencies "rests upon the
assumption that the officer who makes the findings has addressed himself to the evidence
and upon that evidence has conscientiously reached the conclusion which he deems it
to justify." Also, despite the fact that assistants may be used, "the officer who makes
the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them."
87. Taking his analysis at full value, it would seem that what we are dealing with
is an expert body without an expert head. The aberrations to be expected of such an
oddity may account for some of the curious "expert" judgments which the courts have
had to correct. See, e.g., Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U. S. 3 (1915) where the Immigration De-
partment felt that an immigrant should be excluded as "likely to become a public charge"
because the labor market in the city of immediate destination was overstocked; Interna-
tional Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 257 U. S. 506 (1922), where the Secretary of the Treasury
tried unsuccessfully to convince the Court that in the exercise of his informed discretion he
was authorized to forbid, on Sundays and holidays, the entrance into the United States
over international toll bridges spanning the Niagara River of any vehicle except a trolley
car, and any personal baggage; Campbell v. Galeno Chemical Co., 281 U. S. 599 (1930)
where the Commissioner of Prohibition unsuccessfully maintained that he had determined
that the use of whiskey in medicinal preparations "was susceptible to grave abuse" and
that in the exercise of his expert judgment he had discretion to deny permits for such
use unless the indispensability of the whiskey to the product could be demonstrated (a
requirement not specified in the Act); Wyman Gordon Co. v. N. L. R. B., 153 F. (2d)
480 (C. C. A. 7th, 1946) where the judgment of the agency was that persistent careless
handling of airplane propeller blades during heat treatment was not a sufficient reason
for discharging the careless employee because the interruption of war production caused
by the carelessness was not "serious."
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agencies of the Government are susceptible of the exercise of expert
knowledge and judgment to the extent that the courts must consider this
expertness a factor in determining how far they can go in examining
the merits of administrative determinations. A review of all of the ad-
ministrative agencies of the Government with this question in mind
would enlarge this discussion beyond reasonable dimensions. But it can
scarcely be doubted that a survey of five of the principal agencies, name-
ly, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the Federal Communications Commission, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission and the National Labor Relations Board, will yield
a result fairly representative of all. These five are, with the exception
of the temporary wartime agencies, probably the most in the public eye
and not the least the objects of deference by the Supreme Court of the
United States on the theory that they are expert bodies working in
specialized fields.
The Interstate Commerce Commission
This agency administers not only the Interstate Commerce Act
itself,"' but also at least 35 other statutes in whole or in part. 9 A sum-
mary of the functions of the Interstate Commerce Commission covers
almost six closely written pages in the United States Government Manual
for 1945. These functions embrace the regulating not only of railroads,
but also of motor carriers, water carriers and freight forwarders in such
matters as the supervision of rates, prevention of undue preferences, es-
tablishment of through rates and joint rates, regulation of car service
and pooling of services, supervision of accounts, records, issuance of
securities and reorganizations, investigation of provisions relative to
safety appliances, locomotive inspection and many others. It is not
difficult to find among these activities a number with respect to which
there can be no serious doubt that the Commission is genuinely engaged
in a complicated and technical field which calls for specialized knowl-
edge--in other words, in which it may properly be said to be acting as an
expert. One example will suffice: The Safety Appliance Act9 requires
the Commission to investigate and report on the use and necessity of
block-signal systems and appliances for the automatic control of railway
trains.l No one would be disposed to deny that when acting pursuant
to that section the Commission is dealing with a highly technical subject
88. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 STAT. 379, 49 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-22 (1929).
89. Monograph of Attorney Genera's Committee, SEN. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., ist
Sess., Part 11.
90. Act of March 2,.1893, c. 196, 27 STAT. 531, 45 U. S. C. A. §§ 1-46 (1943).
91. 34 STAT. 838, 45 U. S. C. A. § 35 (1943); 35 STAT. 325, 45 U. S. C. A. § 36 (1943).
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and that its findings would have all the value that should be given to
the findings of engineers upon an engineering question.
But the thing which strikes the eye upon reviewing the various ac-
tivities of the Interstate Commerce Commission is that the matters
with respect to which the Commission may properly be said to be expert
are rarely the matters which give rise to controversies and call into
operation the judicial process, thereby furnishing the occasion for the
application by the courts of formulae based upon the supposed expert-
ness of the administrative body. 2
This point is illustrated in the field of valuation. Here the areas of
controversy are mostly not those in which anything approaching scien-
tific accuracy is possible. For example, it is probably fair to say that in
the experience of attorneys dealing with such matters, experts do not
tend to vary greatly in their estimates of reproduction costs, if it is
agreed what is to be reproduced. 3 The disputes have to do rather with
such questions as what is to be reproduced-questions which are outside
the field of the reproduction cost expert. Controversies also arise be-
cause of different political and economic views as to what bases of
valuation are relevant or as to the weight to be accorded to various types
of data. In rate making, the rate of return is likewise fixed, not upon
any scientifically exact basis, but upon an estimate of what is "fair and
reasonable."
It would seem to be the merest pretense to say that where the crux of
the decision as to what a rate shall be is the Commission's view as to
what evidence of valuation is important or what rate of return is fair
and reasonable, the Commission is drawing upon any specialized or
technical knowledge which puts it in a better position than the judiciary
to reach a result in conformity with the statutory mandate. The same
objection to the expertise formula applies in the case of the prevention
of "undue" preferences and to the other criteria which Congress has
established to guide the Commission in the administration of the various
statutes committed to it. These criteria are set forth in the preamble to
the Transportation Act of 1940.11 Congress there declares that it is the
national transportation policy to provide for "fair and impartial regula-
tion" of transportation subject to the Act, "to promote safe, adequate,
92. We have seen (supra page 21) that in the Standard Oil case, Circuit judge Hand
mentioned the example of a finding by chemists as to a chemical reaction as an instance
of the impotence of courts to judge the expert. But the purported analogy is unrealistic.
The example of chemists determining that all life consists of chemical reactions would
have been more to the point under discussion.
93. Cf. 1 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 165-166.
94. Act of Sept. 18, 1940, c. 722, Title I, § 1; 54 STAT. 899; 49 U. S. C. A. § 1
(Supp. 1945).
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economical and efficient service . . . sound economic conditions . . .
reasonable charges . . . without unjust discriminations, undue prefer-
ences, or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices. .. ."
Here we leave science and technology far behind and approach an area
in which things are whatever they are said to be. The standards are so
close to being completely subjective that it is hard to see what special
competence is required beyond what it takes to enable the agency to
say what it likes or dislikes.
The futility of attempting to give weight to supposed expertness in
determining whether the Commission has conformed to these argumen-
tative standards in any given case is well illustrated by Interstate Com-
merce Commission v. City of Jersey City." In 1938, the Commission
had denied an application by the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad Com-
pany to raise the fare on its downtown line from New York to Jersey
City to 10 cents. The denial was upon the ground that although the
Company might be entitled to the increased revenue, it was the prognos-
tication of the Commission, in the exercise of its specialized knowledge,
that patronage would decrease. The Supreme Court held that the action
of the Commission was justified.96 In 1942, the Company filed a petition
for a further hearing, alleging changed conditions and increased costs in
support of the 10-cent fare on the downtown line. The Price Administrator
opposed the increase, as he had authority to do under the Inflation Con-
trol Act of 1942." The Commission, however, increased the downtown
fare to 9 cents and thereafter to 10 cents or eleven trips for $1. It dismissed
the argument of the Price Administrator that the increase would be infla-
tionary. Jersey City and the Price Administrator sought to have the
Commission's order enjoined by the District Court. A three judge statu-
tory court granted the injunction upon the grounds that the Commis-
sion had not granted a full hearing and had brushed aside too lightly
the economic stabilization arguments of the Price Administrator. The
Supreme Court reversed the District Court and upheld the Commission,
calling its order "the product of expert judgment which carries a pre-
sumption of validity.""8
But was not the Price Administrator also an expert? And what are we
to say when we are faced with the dilemma of choosing between two
experts, each of whom has made a judgment into which, because of
his expertness, the court ought not to inquire?
If the expertise formula is to be based, as it apparently is, upon the
95. 322 U. S. 503 (1944)
96. 313 U. S. 98 (1941).
97. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, c. 26, 56 STAT. 23, 50 U. S. C. A. App. § 901 et seq. (1944).
98. 322 U. S. 503 at 512 (1944).
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hypothesis that the administrative agency is a specialized body having
abilities in the field superior to those of the court, the formula is obvi-
ously of no use where two administrative agencies have made opposing
judgments about the same question. The question to be decided by the
court covers two fields-the field within the competence of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission and the field within the competence of the
Price Administrator. To attempt to give to the views of either of them
any special weight in the solution of such a question when they are in
disagreement reduces the formula to absurdity.
And this is true not only in situations where the expertness of one
governmental agency clashes with the expertness of another. It is true
in any case in which there is any conflict of expert views whatever. The
Commission must then be not only more expert than the court but
also more expert than any of the contending experts if its expertise is
to be of any value in resolving the conflict of expert opinion.9
The Federal Trade Commission
This agency administers the Federal Trade Commission Act.. and
Sections 2, 3, 7 and 8 of the Clayton Act.''
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act makes unlawful "un-
fair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in commerce," The Clayton Act provisions administered by
the Federal Trade Commission prohibit price discriminations which
affect competition, contracts having the effect of substantially lessen-
ing competition or tending to create a monopoly, and acquisitions of
stock tending to lessen competition, restrain commerce or create a
monopoly.
It is immediately obvious upon even a cursory inspection of these
statutory provisions that if the Federal Trade Commission is to be con-
sidered an expert in many of the fields in which it operates, we must be
using the term in a radically different sense from any in which it has
ever been understood before. In order to develop a specialized body of
knowledge which would be helpful in determining, with respect to any
conceivable method of competition in interstate commerce, whether that
method is or is not "unfair," or in determining, with respect to any con-
99. "One thing is certain, they will do no better with the so-called testimony of ex-
perts than without, except where it is unanimous. If the jury must decide between such
they are as badly off as if they had none to help." Hand, Historical and Practical Con-
siderations Regarding Expert Testimony (1901) 15 H.iv. L. Rr.v. 40, 56.
100. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, c. 311, 38 STAT. 717, as amended by 52 STAT. 111 (1938),
15 U. S. C. A. § 41 et seq. (1938).
I01. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, c. 323, 38 STAT. 730, as amended by 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15
U. S. C. A. §§ 13, 14, 18, 19 (1941).
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ceivable act or practice in. interstate commerce, whether that act or
practice is or is not "unfair or deceptive," the Commission would indeed
have to have capacities and qualifications which have not so far been
found in any human individual or institution. What we approach here
is the concept that there is such a thing as a specialist in all things
knowable.
This is not to suggest that the Commission is never confronted with a
problem of a technical nature and properly the subject of expert opinion.
This may well be so, as in the case of a claimed false advertisement
about a medical product. On such a question, the Commission might
conceivably have a special competence if it were not for the fact that
its field of activity is so broad as to make extravagant the suggestion
that it could ever devote enough attention to that specific type of prob-
lem to become an expert in the field.
But the point is that when Congress used the phrase "unfair methods
of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" it was obvi-
ously talking laymen's language.10 2 And this, in fact, is reasonably clear
from the cases which have come before the Supreme Court involving the.
Federal Trade Commission. Thus, in Federal Trade Comm. v. Keppel
& Bro.,)03 the Court decided, upon the ostensible basis that the Federal
Trade Commission was particularly competent to say so, that a practice
of concealing coins in certain packages of candy was an unfair method
of competition since it encouraged the young to gamble. And in Federal
Trade Commission v. Standard Education Society, 04 the Supreme Court
102. Also, so far as the Clayton Act is concerned, the statutory criteria with which the
Commission works are also those with which the courts and juries work in actions involv-
ing anti-trust law violations.
103. 291 U. S. 304 (1934).
104. 302 U. S. 112 (1937); and note also the recent decision in Jacob Siegel v. Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 14 U. S. LAW WEEm 4268 (U. S. 1946). There the Supreme Court
sent back to the Commission a case in which it had ordered a manufacturer to cease
and desist from using the name of "Alpacuna" to designate coats containing alpaca but
no vicuna. The reason for the remand was that although the Commission "is the expert
body to determine what remedy is necessary to eliminate the unfair or deceptive trade
practices which have been disclosed" (Id. at 4269) and hence is peculiarly qualified to solve
the problem whether any remedy short of prohibition of the use of the name "Alpacuna"
would suffice "to eliminate the deception which they [the Commission] found lurking in
the word" (Id. at 4269), the Commission, unfortunately, had not, in the particular case,
been sufficiently expert to realize that the problem existed and had to be solved; So the
case went back with the gentle admonition that the Commission was "entitled" to ap-
praise the problem in the light, among other things, of "its generalized experience" (Id. at
4269). The case guggests a caveat to the rule that administrative agencies have special
competence to say what remedies will best effectuate the policy of the particular Act being
administered. (See in addition to the Siegel case, Franks Bros. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 321
U. S. 702, 703-704 (1944). It is probably true that in passing on such a question admin-
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expressed the view that the Federal Trade Commission was in a posi-
tion, by reason of its special competence in the field, to say that the
practice of selling encyclopedias by misrepresenting that the purchaser
was getting a discount was unfair and deceptive.
The Federal Communications Commission
The functions of the Federal Communications Commission with re-
spect to radio and wire communication under the Communications Act
of 193405 are analogous to those of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion in the field of transportation. In addition, however, the Communi-
cations Commission has licensing authority over all radio transmitting
apparatus and operators, and control over non-commercial transmis-
sion.106
The standard which the statute requires the Communications Com-
mission to follow is the "public interest, convenience or necessity."''
One would have supposed that the best judge of the "public interest,
convenience, or necessity" is the public, or at least the public's repre-
sentatives in Congress. But this, we are told, is not so. The public has
to be informed by an expert body what its interest, convenience and
necessity are and there is, to all practical effect, no appeal from the ex-
pert's decision on the question. For the Supreme Court has said in Fed-
eral Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.,' that
"In granting or withholding permits for the construction of stations, and in
granting, denying, modifying or revoking licenses for the operation of stations,
'public convenience, interest, or necessity' was the touchstone for the exercise
of the Commission's authority. While this criterion is as concrete as the com-
plicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit,
it serves as a supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert
body which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy ......
The same admonition was repeated in National Broadcasting Co. V.
istrative agencies may develop genuine expertise. But as the Siegel case shows, the agencies
have a way of ignoring the necessity of applying their own special knowledge (and see also
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 313 U. S. 177 (1941). Also, the subjectivity of the
criteria of judgment and the element of prophecy involved are such that it becomes
particularly difficult to distinguish expertise from likes and dislikes in these situations.
The second Chenery case (see note 122 infra) presents an analogous problem.
105. Act of June 19, 1934, c. 652, 48 STAT. 1064, 47 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq. (Supp.
1945).
106. Monograph of Attorney General's Committee on Federal Communications Com-
mission, S-,. Doc. 186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., part 3, 1-5; UNiTED STATES GovFmEaNT
M quAui 1945, 453-458.
107. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 194 (1943).
108. 309 U. S. 134, 137-138 (1940).
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United States,"° where the question was whether the Federal Communi-
cations Commission might validly provide by regulation that no license
should be granted to a standard broadcast station having any agree-
ment with a network organization under which the station was pre-
vented from broadcasting the programs of another network organiza-
tion, and that other previous practices of the networks be modified. The
case is revealing for the manner in which it sanctions the concept of
expertise as applied to the field of controversial political and economic
questions. Clearly, there are highly technical matters connected with
wire and radio communication as to which the Commission may well
be considered as having special competence. Indeed, it is difficult to
imagine a subject which, in its technical aspects, is more difficult and
complicated. Thus, when the Commission determines which frequencies
are most feasible for the operation of frequency modulated broadcast
transmission, we may well concede it a special technical competence,
despite the fact that the inventor of frequency modulation, and the
greatest expert in the field, claims that the Commission manifests no
competence whatever in handling this technical problem." 0  But the
question of network organization is not a problem to be determined upon
scientific principles peculiar to radio communication. It is an economic,
and to a degree, a political matter in which the criterion of the public
interest, convenience or necessity can be made to mean whatever the
agency or the court wishes it to mean. What the Federal Communica-
tions Commission understands it to mean is indicated by the recent news
dispatch.' announcing that the Commission proposes to regulate the
content of radio programs, despite the fact that the Communications
Act itself specifically prohibits the Commission from exercising any cen-
sorship function." 2
This is an apt instance of the extension of a discretion incautiously
sanctioned. The discretion itself is not properly predicated of any
special competence in the field of radio communication, since it pro-
ceeds upon views as to the interrelation of radio communication and
other fields as to which the Communications Commission cannot claim
to be in any degree expert.
109. 319 U. S. 190, 224 (1943).
110. For details of this debate see the N. Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1945, p. 20; Nov. 10,1
1945, p. 8; Nov. 13, 1945, p. 23; Nov. 18, 1945, Part II, p. 5; Nov. 23, 1945, p. 22; par-
ticularly the letter of Major Armstrong, Nov. 23, 1945, p. 22; see also JoURNAL or FRE-
QUENCY MODULATION, March, 1946, p. 48 and F. M. AND TELEVISION, Feb., 1946, pp. 4, 78.
111. N. Y. Times, March 8, 1946, p. 23.
112. Act of June 19, 1934, c. 652, 48 STAT. 1091, 47 U. S. C. A. § 326 (Supp. 1945).
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The Securities and Exchange Commission
This agency administers the Securities Act of 1933,113 the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934"4 and the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935,"1 in addition to having certain functions in connection with
corporate reorganizations and corporate trust indentures.11
With respect to the issuance of securities, the functions of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission are not unlike those exercised by the
Federal Trade Commission in the field of business practices generally.
As to this, the Securities and Exchange Commission is probably more
expert than the Federal Trade Commission, since its field is limited. It
may be that the Securities and Exchange Commission is more competent
than a jury or a trial judge to determine whether in a given case
sufficient and accurate information has been furnished about a security
or whether an Exchange practice involves manipulation, misrepresenta-
tion or some other fraudulent or deceptive device." 7
As in the case of other agencies, however, one is struck by the circum-
stance that the actions of the Commission which give rise to controver-
sies calling for judicial decisions are in fields in which it is difficult to
find that the Commission can make any claim to special competence jus-
tifying the action which it took. Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Chenery Corporation,"' is of interest in this connection." 9 Acting under
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,12° the Commission ap-
proved a plan of reorganization of a registered holding company whereby
113. Act of May 27, 1933, c. 38, 48 STAT. 74, 15 U. S. C. A. § 77(a) et seq. (1941).
114. Act of June 6, 1934, c. 404, 48 STAT. 881, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78(a) et seq. (1941).
115. Act of Aug. 26, 1935, c. 687, 49 STAT. 838, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79 et seq. (1941).
116. Monograph of Attorney General's Committee, SEzN. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess., part 13; UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1945, pp. 522-527.
117. But if the agency members gain special competence in this field, what hap-
pens to it when they go on the bench? Do Justice Douglas and Circuit Judge Frank
endow their respective courts with any expertise vis-a-vis the Commission?
118. 318 U. S. 80 (1943).
119. So is Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1 (1936), where
it was held that the Commission could not rationalize a claimed discretion to refuse to
permit the withdrawal of registration statements which were about to be subject to stop
order proceedings. The Commission's theory was that "an unlimited privilege of withdrawal
would have the effect of allowing registrants whose statements are defective to withdraw
before a stop order was issued and then to submit another statement with slight changes"
(Id. at 22). Dean Landis criticizes the decision (Administrative Policies and the Courts
(1938) 47 YATE L. J. 519, 526-529) on the ground that the Commission was specially com-
petent to say that the withdrawal would be "inadequate" despite the fact that after the
withdrawal the statement could not be the basis of any sale of securities, the only concern
of the Commission under the Act.
120. Act of Aug. 26, 1935, c. 687, 49 STAT. 838, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79 et seq. (1941).
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preferred stock which had been acquired by officers and directors of the
company while plans for its reorganization were before the Commis-
sion would not be converted into stock of the reorganized company,
as would all the other preferred stock, but would be surrendered at
cost plus interest. The Commission explicitly based its order on prin-
ciples of equity judicially established. The Supreme Court, 5 to 3, held
the Commission's order invalid. Both Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing
for the majority, and Mr. Justice Black, writing for the minority., held
that the Commission might, in passing upon matters before it, employ
"the experience gained by it in effectuating the legislative policy.'
21
The point upon which the majority and the minority broke was whether
the Commission had in. fact utilized that experience.
In other words, all the Justices who participated in the case felt that
the determination whether the terms of the issuance of the stock of the
new company were "fair and equitable" or "detrimental to the interests
of investors" within Section 7 of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act was a matter within the field of the special competence of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. Concededly, however, the facts of the
case were not enough to warrant the action of the Commission upon
principles established by courts of equity. This for the reason that
the purchase of the stock had been at a fair price in the open market
and after a full disclosure. Nevertheless, the Securities and Exchange
Commission might, because of its experience gained in effectuating the
legislative policy, hold that such a purchase was unfair and inequita-
ble and detrimental to the interests of investors. Of this, it is utterly
impossible to say anything except, that the Commission, in making any
such pronouncement, would be inventing principles, not finding, facts.
It would be operating far from any field in which technical knowledge is
brought to bear for the purpose of discovering what exists or may be
expected to happen. It would be in the area of subjective judgment in
which, when we say that a thing is unfair, what we really mean is that the
Commission does not like it.12
121. 318 U. S. 80 at 89, 96 (1943).
122. The Commission was not slow to take the Court's hint. On reconsideration, it
adhered to its original determination. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
has disapproved the Commission's decision (Chenery Corp. et al. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, - F. (2d) - (App. -D. C.'1946) C. C. H. Fed. Sec. Serv. p. 90,839. The
Court pointed out: "The Commission's present view in no substantial respect differs from
its original view except that then the Commission grounded its decision 'on principles
of equity derived from judicial decisions,' whereas now it attempts to sustain its position
on what it calls its special experience in administering the legislative policy of the Act."
(Id. at 90,841). After explaining how the Commission rationalized its adherence to its
earlier view the Court concluded: "In practical effect, therefore, the Commission now insists
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The National Labor Relations Board
This Board is charged by the National Labor Relations Act with the
two functions of investigating questions of representation for collective
bargaining of employees within the Act, and the preventing of "any
unfair labor practice' within the terms of the Act.' 23
In considering the trustworthiness of the expertise formula as applied
to the Labor Board, it would probably be sufficient to refer to Republic
Aviation Corp. v. N. L. R. B.'24 The Labor Board had outlawed com-
pany rules against solicitation of union memberships on company prop-
erty outside of working hours and against distribution of union litera-
ture on company parking lots outside of working hours. The Court,
declaring that the Board had weighed conflicting evidence and made a
finding that the rules constituted unfair labor practices in that they were
an unreasonable restriction upon the collective bargaining rights of
employees, solemnly bowed to the Board's expertise on the ground that
Congress intended, in such cases, "to have decisions based upon eviden-
tial facts under the particular statute made by experienced officials with
an adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject which is en-
trusted to their administration."' 2 5 Yet it seems clear that all that ac-
tually happened was that the Board expressed a purely subjective pref-
erence for abolishing the company rules as an undesirable restriction
on the group whose right "to organize for mutual aid without employer
interference ... is the principle of labor relations which the Board is to
foster."'
26
Since, however, this discussion began with the decision of the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in N. L. R. B. v. Standard Oil
Co.,127 it is not inappropriate to revert to that decision for some detailed
consideration of the validity of the claimed expertise of the Labor Board.
The Court said in the Standard Oil case that what the Board had decided
was "that in November, 1941, four and a half years after the 'Associa-
tion' was formed, and at a time when there can be no doubt that a very
great majority of the employees still adhered to it, their adherence was
upon doing precisely what the Supreme Court said it could not do; that is to say, in
applying to this specific case a standard which has never been promulgated, either by the
Commission in its regulations or by legislative Act, and which the Commission says
cannot fairly be generally applied." (Id. at 90,842).
123. Act of July 5, 1935, c. 372, 49 STAT. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 151 et seq., 159, 160
(1942); Monograph of Attorney General's Committee, SEN. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess., part 5; UNTED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1945, 510, 513.
124. 324 U. S. 793 (1945).
125. Id. at 800.
126. Id. at 798.
127. 138 F. (2d) 885 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), see supra pages 19-20.
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a consequence of some carry-over of the respondents' earlier favor of
the 'Plan,' and its well known preference for it over an alliance with any
national union."' 2 8 The determination of this question was, according
to the Court, a matter calling for the peculiar competence of the Labor
Board since it dealt with "the question of how deeply an employer's
relations with its employees will overbear their will, and how long that
influence will last."'" The determination of this question, the Court
tells us, is analogous to determination by chemists as to the chemi-
cal reaction between a number of elements. "Labor disputes," the Court
declares, "might have been considered as demanding no such specialized
knowledge for their solution."' 3 0 Yet relations between employer and
employee "appear to fall into more or less uniform models or patterns,
which put those well skilled in the subject at an advantage which no
bench of judges can hope to rival."' 3'
What we learn here is that the Labor Board has some special compe-
tence to determine what was in the minds of a body of employees in
November 1941, when the only evidence of such a state of mind is evi-
dence that the employer favored a certain labor organization in 1937,
and that this favor presumably influenced the employees who were in
the plant in 1937.
If this is anything other than sheer clairvoyance, it must be because
the Labor Board had some opportunity peculiar to itself to secure some
data on which the question could be answered. To determine whether
it did or not, we turn to the Board's decision.' 32 The opinion contains a
section called "Concluding Findings"'33 in which it appears that in
the Board's view the employees,
"conditioned by 19 years of denial of their right to self-organization, could
reasonably have assumed [in 1937] that the respondents favored the Associa-
tions as they had favored the Plan. 'Timorous habit' firmly moulded by 19
years of domination consequently may well have dictated the employees' choice
of the Associations. It is the circumstance of clear connection between the Plan
and the Associations in the absence of restored neutrality that is most per-
128. Id. at 887.
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid. The overtones in the phrase "might have been considered as demanding"
like those of the phrase "at least it may be thought to be," used on the same page of
the opinion with reference to the question whether an employer's motives can be com-
petently judged by laymen, are difficult to catch. Considered by whom? The suggestion
of sheer subjectivity seems to permeate this whole theory.
131. Id. at 888.
132. Matter of Standard Oil Company, 43 N. L. R. B. 12 (1942).
133. Id. at 56-60.
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suasive in the case. The coincidence of these factors infects the ostensibly new
organization with the 'virus of control.' ,1"'4
One who searches for some indication as to how the Board knew what
the employees might have assumed in 1937, and what factors "may well
have dictated" their choice of a labor organization at that time, and how
it is to be inferred that the state of mind of the employees in 1937 was
also the state of mind of employees in 1941, learns from the Board's
opinion of no data other than earlier decisions by the Board itself es-
tablishing the same principles a priori as rules of presumption or per-
missible conclusions. There is no indication that the Board or its tech-
nical staff ever investigated the mental operations of these or any other
employees or had any data whatever except its own rules of decision
as the basis for the conclusion which the Circuit Court of Appeals so
reverently treats as the product of special competence in the field.
Indeed, we learn from a later decision, Donnelly Garment Co. v.
N. L. R. B.,135 that the Board has resisted the idea of taking any evi-
dence as to what the state of mind of the employees is in such a situa-
tion, despite an earlier direction by the Circuit Court of Appeals that
such evidence should be taken.136 The Board in the Donnelly case took
the position that it preferred to base its conclusion upon what it called
"Cour experience in administration of the Act"'37 without furnishing any
guide (other than its earlier decisions to the same effect) as to what
that experience was or how it furnished a basis for the conclusion
reached. In other words, the theory seems to be that the special com-
petence of expert administrative agencies can be vindicated only by ac-
cepting their findings and declarations of policy, not only without in-
dependent investigation, but also without requiring that they even be
rationalized.
Expertise in the Index
It is this aspect of rationality which is really the crux of the matter.
An expert is treated specifically as such only to the extent that his find-
ings and recommendations are taken on faith, i.e., upon the ground
that he possesses superior knowledge, and that it is not competent for
the layman, having once satisfied himself that the expert sounds like an
,expert, to make any independent determination on the subject. The
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Standard Oil case cer-
tainly purports to accept this theory wholeheartedly to the extent of
134. Id. at 57-58..
135. 151 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 8th, 1945).
136. Donnelly Garment Co. v. N. L. R. B., 123 F. (2d) 215 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
137. 5 N. L. R. B. 241, 242 (1943). And note Chenery Corp. v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, - F. (2d) (App. D. C. 1946); cited note 122 supra.
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declining to go into'the question of the validity of the Board's conclu-
sion in that case. The curious thing is that upon close analysis of what
the Court actually did in the Standard Oil case, as distinguished from
what it said (and this is true of many other cases, as will be seen pres-
ently), it may be perceived that the stultifying character of the expertise
formula has actually prevented most courts from withholding their
own appraisal of the propriety of the actions of the administrative agen-
cies, however firmly they may announce that they propose to abdicate
the judicial function in such cases. Observe that Judge Hand in the
Standard Oil case stated that the question which "for all practical pur-
poses [is] not open to us at all" was whether the Board was correct
in concluding that the adherence of the employees to the Association
in November, 1941, was a consequence of some carry-over of the Com-
pany's favor of the Plan in 1937. Actually, this is not what the Board
concluded. What the Board said was that "timorous habit" after nine-
teen years of domination "may well have dictated""' the employees'
vote for the Association in 1937. All this amounts to is a determination
that such subservience on the part of the employee possibly existed, not
that it actually did exist. When the Court said that there was "sub-
stantial evidence" to support the Board's conclusion, the Court was, in
point of actual fact, saying precisely what the Board had said, namely,
that the existence of such subservience was a possible conclusion on the
facts presented. So that, in reality, the case was not decided without an
independent determination by the Court of the very question upon
which the Board had passed. In other words, the purported distinction
made by the Court between an examination of the record for the pur-
pose of determining whether there was "substantial evidence" to support
the Board's conclusion, and an examination of the record for the purpose
of determining whether the Board was right or wrong, is a mere
verbalism. 139
Nor is this actual identity between the two mental operations on
the part of the court confined to the kind of situation presented in the
Standard Oil case. The same thing happens in decisions as to the actions
138. Emphasis not in original.
139. There may, of course, be cases in which the distinction is real. Cases, for example,
of conflicting witnesses,, which do not bring the expertise formula into play at all. Or
cases in which the Court actually finds what the Court in the Standard Oil case said it
found, viz., that the agency could be either right or wrong in result, but had substantial
evidence to support the result it reached (see cases cited in Dobson v. Commissioner, 320
U. S. 489, 501 (1943). But even in that kind of a case, it is the Court, not the agency,
which finally says that the agency could be right. And the process of deciding whether
the agency could be right requires the Court to make as much of an independent appraisal
of the evidence as if it were called on to decide whether the agency actually was right.
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of administrative agencies in the field of rate making. The Supreme
Court has declared4 ° that the actual accuracy of the decision of a rate-
making body is not subject to review, the only justiciable question being
whether the rate established is confiscatory. The suggestion here is
that there may be an area of agency action within which the agency
will be permitted to act whether its determination is right or wrong, the
only function of the court being to determine whether the agency has
gone outside of the area-i.e., into the field where the rate which it has
established becomes confiscatory. (We need not here stop to analyze
the possibility adverted to by Chief Justice Stone in his dissenting opin-
ion in Colorado Interstate Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 4' that
utility regulation may result in a permissible diminution of property
values and income "provided the regulation does not so exceed constitu-
tional limitations as to be 'confiscatory' "-as if it were necessary to
get some distance beyond the constitutional boundaries before there
could be constitutional objections.) But there is actually no middle
ground in the field of rate making between a rate which is right and a
rate which is confiscatory. In Ohio Valley Water Company v. Ben
Avon Borough,4 2 the line was drawn between a "reasonable" rate which
is, by hypothesis, synonymous with a correct rate, and an "unreason-
able" rate which is synonymous with a confiscatory rate.
The doctrine established by the Ben Avon case that, in view of the
due process question involved, the Court will review the facts where the
question of a confiscatory rate is presented, is really not as peculiar
to that field as one might suppose on first impression. Even in a case
where there is some middle ground between the right conclusion (i.e.,
the conclusion which the court would reach) and an inadmissible con-
clusion, and the court protests that it will go no further than to say
that the agency has not wandered out of the middle ground, 143 the facts
have certainly been reviewed whether the court admits it or not. Un-
less they are reviewed there is no way of telling whether the agency has
kept to the middle ground or not. And a strong case could probably
be made out for the proposition that the mental operation involved in
determining whether the agency is in the middle ground involves a meas-
urement of the distance between the right conclusion and the inadmissi-
ble conclusion-hence a determination by the court where the right con-
clusion lies. But the important point is that the decision whether the
expert has kept to the reservation is not made by the expert but by the
court.
140. E.g., Federal Power Commission v. Pipe Line Co., 315 U. S. 575 (1942).
141. 324 U. S. 581, 625 (1945).
142. 253 U. S. 287 (1920).
143. Cf. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489, 501 (1943); see note 119 supra.
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The difficulty of rationalizing any real difference between a right con-
clusion and a permissible conclusion is illustrated by Federal Power
Commission v. Hope Naturat Gas Co.'44 There the decision was that
if the Power Commission reached a result which was reasonable, it was
not within the competence of the Court to discover or pass upon the
grounds upon which the Commission reached its result. Thus the Court
said:
"If the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and un-
reasonable, judicial inquiry under the Act is at an end."' 45
This is deceptively simple as a matter of words. When it comes,
however, to an investigation of mental processes it is at once obvious
that there is no way of finding out whether the result in a rate case is
just and reasonable unless we appraise the data on which it was arrived
at. This was well brought out in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Jackson:
"The Court sustains this order as reasonable, but what makes it so or what
could possibly make it otherwise, I cannot learn.' 46
Mr. Justice Frankfurter had a similar difficulty, saying:
"It will not do to say that it must all be left to the skill of experts. Expertise
is a rational process and a rational process implies expressed reasons for
judgment.' 47
In saying that "a rational process implies expressed reasons for judg-
ment," Mr. Justice Frankfurter was propounding a gospel truth. He
might have added that a rational result is, by definition, a result arrived
at by a rational process. Yet the majority opinion manifests a sounder
instinct as to the effect of calling expertise a rational process in this
sense. Rational it may be, but the whole point of it is that it is accord-
ing to an order of reason beyond the competence of ordinary men like
judges. If the expert must submit his reasons to the appraisal of the
non-expert, there is little advantage in having him at all, since the non-
expert controls. There is obviously a dilemma here. The majority em-
braces expertise and, in effect, abandons reason. The minority embraces
reason and, in effect, abandons expertise.
Other doctrines which have actually been applied by the Supreme
Court are at variance with the assumption of the expertness of adminis-
144. 320 U. S. 591 (1944).
145. Id. at 602.
146. Id. at 645-646.
147. Id. at 627.
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trative agencies. It was lofig ago established that the Interstate Com-
merce Commission must submit, not only its conclusions, but also
its findings, and that in the absence of sitfficient findings its order will
not be permitted to stand.'48 The same rule has been applied to the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, 4' as already indicated, and to the
National Labor Relations Board.5 0 But there is, of course, no con-
ceivable purpose to be served by requiring an expert to submit his
findings and to insist that the findings must support his conclusion unless
it is for the purpose of reserving the right to question his judgment-
i.e., to decline to treat him as an expert.
That the Supreme Court does not actually hesitate to disagree with
administrative agencies where their determinations do not meet the
Court's approval is evident from a review of the decisions of the last
few years. Thus, determinations by the Wage and Hour Administra-
tor have been overturned by the Supreme Court without receiving any
of the respect which would ordinarily be accorded to the findings of
an expert.' 5'
In the 1943 term of the Supreme Court the Government lost 14 cases
involving dissenting opinions. Four of these cases involved federal regu-
lation and three of them 52 involved the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion.153 In the 1944 term actions of federal regulating agencies were at
issue in 22 of the non-unanimous decisions studied by Professor
Pritchett." 4 Six of these cases involved the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, and the Commission was overruled in three of these. Accord-
ing to Professor Pritchett:
"The Interstate Commerce Commission cases constitute an exception to the
rule in administrative regulation cases. That agency has encountered more
opposition from the Court than the other federal regulatory agencies have
experienced, and the attitudes of the individual justices toward the I.C.C.
are almost the exact opposite of their reactions toward the other agencies.
148. Florida v. United States, 282 U. S. 194 (1931); United States v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co., 293 U. S. 454 (1935); United States v. Carolina Carriers Corp., 315 U. S. 475
(1942); Yonkers v. United States, 320 U. S. 685 (1944); Eastern Central Association v.
United States, 321 U. S. 194 (1944).
149. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U. S. 80' (1943).
150. As in Phelps-Dodge Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 313 U. S. 177 (1941) and N. L. R. B.
v. Virginia Electric Light & Power Co., 314 U. S. 469 (1941).
151. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944); Jewell Ridge Corp. v. Local
No. 6167, 325 U. S. 161, 169 (1945).
152. Yonkers v. United States, 320 U. S. 685 (1944); Thomson v. United States, 321
U. S. 19 (1944) and Eastern Central Association v. United States, 321 U. S. 194 (1944).
153. Pritchett, Dissent on the Supreme Court (1945) 39 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 47, 50.
154. Pritchett, The Divided Supreme Court (1945) 44 MscH. L. Ray. 427.
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Three of the four left wing justices voted against the I.C.C. oftener than they
voted for it, whereas the other five justices were predominantly favorable to
the I.C.C., Frankfurter and Stone supporting it in every one of the six cases.
The explanation of this special situation is that the I.C.C. has become suspect
by the liberals odf the Court as tending to protect the entrenched interests of
the railroads as challenged by their truck competitors and the public gen-
erally."1155
The National Labor Relations Board, on the other hand, receives
more favorable treatment from the Supreme Court than the other ad-
ministrative agencies, particularly the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion.'"
It is a curious commentary upon the genuineness of the expertise for-
mula that the one field which can most properly be called an expert and
scientific field-the field of patents-is the field in which the courts
do not hesitate to embark upon the most esoteric and complicated sci-
entific investigations despite the fact that the expert judgment of the
officials of the Patent Office is concededly entitled to'weight as a deter-
mination in favor of the validity of the patent."'
Some of the Implications
So much for a critical examination of the question how far the agen-
cies may claim the respect which is due to expert technicians, and of
the question of the extent to which the courts actually do extend to
them such deference. Another, and equally important, question remains.
If the theory be accepted at face value-and there is unquestionably
an articulate and energetic school in favor of such acceptance 5 ---what
are the implications? How may we expect the present doctrines of
judicial review to be affected? Are there any observable indications of
broader effects on theories of jurisprudence?
For example, to what extent is it likely that the concept of expertise
will be applied so as to permit the administrative agency not only to be
accorded finality within its field but also to determine what its own field
is and to enlarge it where that appears to it desirable? We have come
some distance along this road already.159 In N. L. R. B. v. Hearst Pub-
155. Id. at 436; cf. Brown. Fact and Law in Judicial Review (1943) 56 HtAv. L. Rav.
899, 924-925.
156. Dodd, Supreme Court and Labor (1945) 58 HARv. L. Rxv. 1018, 1067-1068.
157. Crosley Corp. v. Westinghouse E. & M. Co., 152 F. (2d) 895, 904 (C. C. A. 3d,
1945); J. A. Mohr & Son v. Alliance Securities Co., 14 F. (2d) 799 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
158. See supra pages 23-24.
159. "When a tribunal is created to perform certain governmental functions in accord-
ance with established policies and is authorized to act -under stipulated conditions, the
absolute existence of facts indicating the presence of such conditions is immaterial so far
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lications,16 0 the Court left it to the Labor Board to determine whether
certain persons were "employees" within the meaning of the Act and
thus subject to the Board's jurisdiction. Of course, the Board is, by
hypothesis, to be treated as an expert only if it is assumed to be acting
within its field. There is therefore some difficulty in seeing how it can
be allowed to establish itself as an expert through a definition of the
term "employee" in such a way as to bring the case within its jurisdic-
tion, at the same time assuming that it has jurisdiction in order to at-
tribute to itself the special competence which is necessary to give weight
to its definition of the term. Yet that is precisely what it was permitted
to do. The Court said that the task of defining the term "has been as-
signed primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the
Act.... Resolving that question, like determining whether unfair labor
practices have been committed, 'belongs to tlte usual administrative rou-
tine' of the Board."'' The determination, moreover, was treated by the
Court as a determination of fact. 62
It is not to the present purpose to become embroiled in the heated
academic controversy over the question whether a determination that a
given situation comes within a statutory definition is a question of fact,
or a question of law, or a mixed question of law and fact.'63 It would
seem to be obvious, that it is really not one but two questions, each of
which may be of varying degrees of difficulty. To the extent that the
determination has to do with the existence or non-existence of some-
thing in the physical world (e.g., in the Hearst case, under what condi-
tions the newsboys worked and what they did) it is a question of fact.
The evidence about it may or may not be in dispute and there may or
may not be differences of opinion about inferences of fact to be drawn
from the evidentiary facts. The question, nevertheless, is still one of
fact. But when that question has been determined, there is still a ques-
tion left, namely, whether, in using a certain term in the statute (e.g., in
the Hearst case the term "employee") Congress expressed an intention
as the authority of that agency is concerned. The validity of administrative action de-
pends upon the facts as found by the adjudicating agency in a legally conducted pro-
ceeding for that purpose." Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion
(1938) 47 YALE L. J. 577, 594.
160. 322 U. S. 111 (1944), and see Note (1944) 57 HARM. L. REv. 1112.
161. 322 U. S. 111, 130 (1944).
162. Id. at 130-131; Cf. Shields v. Utah, Idaho R. Co., 305 U. S. 177, 180-181 (1938)
and N. L. R. B. v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 319 U. S. 50 (1943).
163. Some excellent analytical writing has recently been devoted to this subject.
See, for example, Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Com-
parative Analysis (1944) 58 HARv. L. REv. 70; Brown, Fact and Law in Judicial Review
(1943) 56 HARv. L. REv. 899; and Isaacs, The Law and the Facts (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 1.
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to have the Act apply to those facts. The question whether Congress
did or did not express a certain intention in using a particular word
would seem clearly to be a question of law.' This question likewise may
be simple or difficult of solution, but decided it must be.
For practical purposes, the question whether the matter is to be
treated as a dispute about facts or as a dispute about law may well turn
on the question of which phase-i.e., the factual phase or the legal phase
-is the thing which demands attention because of its difficulty. 6
In the Hearst case there was little dispute about what the actual facts
were. The real question was whether Congress had them in mind when
it used the term "employee." So that in deciding that the Board had
special competence to pass upon the matter, the Court was not only
giving the Board a leg up in expanding its own jurisdiction, but also
treating its views of the law with the same deference given to the opinions
of experts on the facts. This deference to the legal conclusions of ad-
ministrative agencies was foreshadowed in Medo Photo Supply Cor-
poration v. N. L. R. B.' 66
Along with the growing judicial emphasis on the asserted special
competence of administrative agencies, there have developed other curi-
ous doctrines. One is that administrative, agencies are established for
the purpose of vindicating public rights and thus occupy a preferred posi-
tion entitling them to special consideration from the courts. 1 ' It is in-
164. It has been suggested that the question should be treated as one of law if it is
generalized in nature, e.g., such a question as whether the Rule against Perpetuities may
operate to render void a grantor's power of termination for breach of condition subsequent,
and as one of fact if it relates only to the application of a statute to the facts of a par-
ticular case, as in the Hearst case (see Brown, op. cit. supra note 163 at 900). But this will
scarcely do. Whatever generalized premises a Court may use in its chain of reasoning,
all it ever concludes is that the facts of the particular case before it are governed by
some statutory or other principle. That is to say, the rule of law is never decisive of
the case until it has become particular.
165. This seems to be the present status of the rule of reviewability of Tax Court
decisions. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489 (1943) laid it down that such decisions
would not be reviewed except where they turned on unmistakable questions of law. In
Bingham's Trust v. Commissioner, - U. S. -, 65 Sup. Ct. 1232 (1945) the question of
the applicability of the statute was held reviewable as one of law where there was no
dispute about the facts, because the answer turned "on the meaning of the words" of the
section, (id. at 1235).
166. 321 U. S. 678, 681-682n (1944); see also Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Associated Gas & Electric Co., 99 F. (2d) 795, 798 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Note (1943) 56
HARv. L. REv. 1002; Landis, Administrative Policies and the Courts (1938) 47 YALE L. J.
519, 531-536.
167. E.g., Virginia Electric Light & Power Co. v. N. L. R. B., 319 U. S. 533, 543
(1943) ; National Licorice Co. v. N. L. R. B., 309 U. S. 350, 362-363 (1940) ; Amalgamated
Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U. S. 261 (1940).
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teresting in this connection to observe that scholars who have consid-
ered the matter closely are unable to find any genuine distinction be-
tween public law and private law or any evidence of a principle
according to which public agencies are entitled as litigants to any special
standing because they are public16 8
It is probably true that what the agencies are really suggesting in
such cases is that they are specially privileged litigants in that they rep-
resent certain classes which have a higher standing before the law than
other classes. The existence of partisanship of this kind has been ad-
mitted by Dean Landis. He says: "Partisanship on the part of the
administrative tribunals is thus to be expected. It is there to carry out
the provisions of the legislation."' 69 Pound makes a similar suggestion
and points out that the decision of the administrative agency can more
realistically be said to be made at the beginning of the case than at the
end, because it then decided to take action. From that point on it is
engaged in vindicating its own judgmentY.70 But this is scarcely a reason
for enlarging the immunity of the administrative agencies from judicial
review. As was pointed out by the Lord Chancellor's Committee on
Ministers Powers:
"Indeed we think it is clear that bias from strong and sincere conviction as
to public policy may operate as a more serious disqualification than pecuniary
interest.... But the bias to which a public spirited man is subjected if he ad-
judicates in any case in which he is interested on public grounds is more subtle
and less easy for him to detect and resist."' 7 1
Another sign-post along the road to administrative finality is the
recent decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in United
States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, Inc."2 that where the Interstate
Commerce Commission has two cases before it, it may use the evidence
in one as a basis for its findings in the other."' It had, of course, long
168. Chroust, Law And The Administrative Process: An Epistemological Approach To
Jurisprudence (1945) 58 HtAv. L. REv. 573, 581-582; Pound, Place of the Judiciary in Demo-
cratic Polity (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 133, 137-138.
169. Symposium on Administrative Law (1939) 9 Am. LAW SCir. R v. 139, 181.
170. Pound, Public Law and Private Law (1939) 24 Courw. L. Q. 469.
171. C. M. D. 4060 (1932) London.
172. - U. S. -, 66 Sup. Ct. 687 (1946).
173. In Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 154-155 (1941) the Court
had held that official statistics were properly used because they went into evidence with-
out objection, since even in a court of law a record could be made in this way. Later, in
Market St. Ry. Co. v. R. R. Comm., 324 U. S. 548, 561-562 (1945), it was held that
the company's figures were properly used though they were not in evidence at all, since "no
prejudice" was shown. Now we learn from the Pierce case that the Opp and Market St.
cases, taken together, stand for the rule that in the case of an administrative agency, as in
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been the rule that an administrator is bound "to consider the evidence,
to be guided by that alone, and to reach his conclusion uninfluenced by
extraneous considerations which in other fields might have play in deter-
mining purely executive action."'"4 This was considered part of the re-
quirement of "a fair and open hearing" which is essential to the integ-
rity of the quasi-judicial administrative process.""
But it was inevitable that this should be watered down. If "science
and technology," administered by experts, are to "reshape society"'1 6
(i.e., if we are to have technocracy, as apparently we are), is not the
whole concept of a "fair and open hearing" something of an anachron-
ism? How is the expert body really to bring its expertise into play
unless it can draw upon its store of esoteric lore without having to ask
whether it is in evidence?
So perhaps we shall have to do without the "fair and open hearing."
There may, indeed, be those who will agree that the loss will scaTcely be
felt since the value of the opportunity to put in evidence is question-
able if the agency is at liberty to disregard all of it without being sub-
ject to reversal under the "substantial evidence" rule17 7 provided it has
adduced some evidence of its own. 178 Indeed, one may well ask how the
"substantial evidence" rule itself will fare under the attrition of the for-
mula that determinative knowledge may come to the agency from
sources outside the record.
Another bizarre development has been the repudiation, with respect
to the administrative agencies, of the well established rule that where
evidence is as consistent with one of two opposite hypotheses as it is
with the other, it does not tend to prove either.' That this is true was
always as obvious as any other principle of reasoning. If it were not
true, there could be no such thing as deduction at all, for if any cir-
cumstance could ever be said to point equally in the direction .of two
opposite inferences, there would never be any way of knowing which of
the case of a court, "the mere fact that the determining body has looked beyond the
record does not invalidate its action unless substantial prejudice is shown to result" (66
Sup. Ct. 687 at 695 (1946)). But what could the "substantial prejudice" be other than
the use by the agency of the wrong kind of evidence? And does not the question of
whether the evidence was the right kind or the wrong kind present a point to be decided
by the agency in the exercise of its expert judgment?
174. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 480 (1936).
175. Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 14-15 (1938).
176. Frankfurter, supra page 23.
177. Supra, pages 31-32.
178. The jury is scarcely an analogue. It puts in no evidence of its own, nor is it dedi-
cated to any partisan policy.
179. Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U. S. 90, 94 (1930), holding that in such a case there is
no question of fact to submit to a jury.
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the inferences to draw. It would be possible to guess, but no more.
This evident principle has been discarded in the case of the Labor
Board. The Circuit Courts of Appeals used to think that it had as
much validity in Labor Board cases as in any other.18 At least until
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied it in Nevada
Consolidated Copper Corp. v. N. L. R. B. 8' But the Supreme Court
reversed11 2 and it is now the established rule, at least in Labor Board
cases, that if opposite inferences may equally well be drawn from the
same circumstances, the selection of one of such inferences is the proper
function of the Board, which will not be disturbed by the courts.
So we find ourselves back where we started. Circumstances which
do not tend to prove one thing any more than they tend to prove the
opposite weigh nothing, which is to say, they are unweighable. In other
words, they appear to be the "imponderables" which, we are told, expert
administrative agencies are particularly skilled in weighing.1 83
Conclusion
What may be deduced from the foregoing discussion is really that a
doctrine is developing according to which it is less and less important,
in determining rights and obligations, public and private, to be con-
cerned about the actual facts. 84 Some eminent scholars feel that this is
but a step in the development of the Marxist concept of the gradual dis-
appearance of law. 8' This may or may not be true. The important
point is that a decision of fact upon which the adjustment of the rights
180. E.g., Bussman Mfg. Co. v. N. L. R. B., 111 F. (2d) 783, 787 (C. C. A. 8th, 1940);
Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. N. .. R. B., 135 F. (2d) 15 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943).
181 122 F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A, 10th, 1941). The decision went on the authority of
Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U. S. 90 (1930).
182. N. L. R. B. v. 'Nevada Consolidated Copper Co., 316 U. S. 105, 106 (1942).
183. This may account for the plaintive note in the following lines penned by a harassed
manufacturer on his way home from Washington:
"When agencies weigh the unweighable,
Then tell me to 'cease and desist,'
The impulse to say the unsayable
Is awfully hard to resist."
184. See, for example, Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U. S
573, 581-582 (1940) where the Court laid it down that "in a domain of knowledge still
shifting and growing and in a field where judgment is therefore necessarily beset by the neces-
sity of inferences bordering on conjecture even for those learned in the art, it would be
presumptuous for courts, on the basis of inflicting expert testimony, to deem the view of
the administrative tribunal, acting under legislative authority, offensive to the Four-
teenth Amendment."
185. Report of Special Committee on Administrative Law (1938) 63 A. B. A. RFP
331, 340.
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and obligations of citizens depends is essentially judicial, no matter in
what other terms it may be described. Little that has been so far re-
vealed in the workings of the administrative agencies gives any reason-
able ground for the belief that such decisions can be reliably made
without the detachment which is essential to critical judgment in all
matters, juridical and otherwise. Or that they can be made better than
by those who stand completely apart from the controversy and have
no interest in it, as by the jury, chosen by lot from the community,
sworn to hear the evidence and a true verdict render without fear or
favor, or as by the judge, whose immemorial characteristic has been
utter impartiality in addition to his learning.
It is to the interest of an enlightened jurisprudence that the im-
partiality of these traditional fact-finding agencies and the sound com-
munity instinct which they contribute should not be carelessly discarded
in the febrile pursuit of the fancied aid to be derived in such matters
from an expertise which reveals, upon close examination, that it is little
more than "a new formula in words . .. smoothly and confidently pre-
sented."
